The effects of education externality on schooling by Fukumura, Koichi
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
 
The effects of education externality on schooling 
 
 
Koichi Fukumura 
 
Discussion Paper 15-05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
 
 
The effects of education externality on schooling 
 
 
Koichi Fukumura 
 
Discussion Paper 15-05 
 
The effects of education externality on schooling
Koichi Fukumuray
Abstract
This study theoretically investigates the effects of educational envy on schooling decisions. I develop a model
where in workers enjoy utility from their levels of education and consumption. Moreover, worker’s utility also
depends on other worker’s education levels, i.e., we assume the “keeping up with Joneses” effect in education.
The main result of this study is that such envy causes workers to make decisions on education level that differ from
the decision made when envy is not considered. This result can explain the United States-Japan differences in
the relationship between wages and schooling decisions. Analysis from a social planner’s perspective reveals that
certain conditions on parameters can change the social preferences for the education level selected by individuals.
Moreover, the model indicates that the economy may be overeducated in terms of the education for education’s
sake situation.
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1 Introduction
Education is frequently viewed as playing a very important role in human society. For developing countries, the
United Nations established the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The second target of the MDGs
is to achieve a full course of primary schooling for all children throughout the world by 2015. As a result, most
developing countries have attempted to facilitate elementary education. For developed countries, primary education
is provided to almost of all children, and the schooling rates of more higher education have increased. Therefore,
these countries have developed more sophisticated societies. Furthermore, higher education has contributed to both
the growth of specific countries and overall global growth through technical innovations.
In the economic literature, Becker (1962) is famous for developing the theory of human capital formation.
His study investigated the effect of human capital, which is accumulated through education and training, and
affects the economy by considering the marginal benefits and marginal costs of education. Subsequently, many
studies have been conducted on the relationship between human capital investment and its returns. The returns are
primarily measured using wages or several other monetary measures. Therefore wages are frequently viewed as
being determined by education or human capital. Mincer (1958) theorized the wage equation into the Mincerian
wage equation, which is frequently used to determine the factors that affect wages. Moretti (2004) used Mincerian
wage equation to empirically study the relationship among schooling year, place of habitat, and wages. The study
showed that increasing the number of highly educated people in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) induces an
increase in the wages in that MSA, called the spillover effect. And Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) showed that the
school performance of children in the United States is significantly and positively affected by social networks after
controlling for other factors. This result suggests a positive education externality, as this study assumes. Though
empirical studies are fewer in Japan because of data restrictions, Hashimoto and Heath (1995) estimated the income
elasticities of educational expenditures in Japan. The average estimated elasticity of education is 1.72, a result that
suggests the existence of an education externality in Japan. And there are many other empirical researches which
supports the externalities. Therefore, the existence of human capital externality is undoubted.
We review actual data on education and wages to determine the relationship between wage differences and
schooling decisions. Standard economic theory states that the growth of wage differences between educations
induces an increasing in schooling length. However, there exist some data that are contrary to the theory. Wage
differences between high school graduates and university graduates are typically introduced; however, this study
introduces wage differences of high school graduates and non-high school graduates between the United States and
Japan. Figure 1 depicts data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Historical Time Series Tables on School
Enrollment in the United States and time series data from School Basic Survey in Japan. In the United States, the
rate of high school graduation increased slightly since 1970. In contrast, in Japan, the rate of high school enrollment
significantly increased between 1950 and 1980, and increased slowly after 1980. Standard economic theory states
that the growth in high school graduation rates induces a reduction in relative wages between those who graduate
and those who do not. Figure 2 from the CPS data indicates that wages in the United States declined relative to the
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The US. rate represents the rate of high school graduates in the age group of 18-24 years old from the CPS survey. The Japanese rate shows
the rate of high school enrollments in the population who completed 9 years education from the School Basic Survey. I can not obtain the
graduation rate in Japan, however, the high school quitting rate in Japan is in the range of approximately 2-3% , I obtained this from the data.
Figure 1: U.S. high school graduation rates and enrollment rates in Japan
wages of high school graduates—as predicted by economic theory. In contrast, Japanese relative wages indicate
two unreasonable movements and values. First, despite the growing number of high school students, wages of
junior high school graduates did not decline. Typically, the labor force flows into high relative wage sectors if
other conditions remain constant. However, the data show flatter movements. Second, the most unusual point
is that the wage levels of high school graduates and non-graduates are almost identical, which is obvious from
Figure 2. Figure 2 depicts that the relative wage of high school non-graduates is approximately 1, suggesting that
graduating from high school does not affect the wages in Japan. Therefore, schooling decision of the Japanese
is viewed as also being determined by non-monetary factors.1 These puzzling motions and values are naturally
caused by the “keeping up with the Joneses” thoughts of individuals getting an education. That is, a person decides
to go to school not because wages of high school graduates are high but because others are attending school. In
Japan, many parents want to send their children to highly ranked high schools and universities regardless of the
cost. For example, they typically pay more than U1 million (approximately more than US$8,500) per year to
cram schools (Jyuku in Japanese), in addition to paying the high school tuition to enroll in such highly ranked
educational institutions. Moreover, the high cost of education cost is seen as a contributing factor to the low birth
rate in Japan.
Before we begin to describe the model, we review the “keeping up with Joneses” consumption effects as the ed-
ucational effect is similar. Many researchers studied the “keeping up with Joneses” consumption effects. The first
study that we address is Abel (1990), who developed an asset pricing model that considered aggregate consump-
tion per capita, investigated its effect on asset pricing, and showed that the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect is
1In Japan, when we consider bonuses in wages, the ratio of wages with bonus was 1.16, whereas the ratio of wages without bonus was 1.11
in 2013. Bonuses seem to increase the wage difference. However, the increase is not as large when we compared with the increase in the ratio
of wages in Japan between high school graduates and university graduates, 1.33 to 1.41. Therefore, the wage difference between high school
graduates and non-graduates in Japan is not as wide even we considered bonuses.
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Figure 2: Relative wages of high school graduates and non-graduates in the U.S. and Japan
a source of equity premiums. Similarly, Abel (1990) indicated that the “keeping up with Joneses effect” may be
a source of the puzzle we mentioned in Figure 1 and 2. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) explored taxation effects on
“keeping up with the Joneses” consumption. Their study found that although several externalities exist, govern-
ment taxation is a good way to control the economy. The implication of their paper is utilized in the discussion on
policies in this study. Dupor and Liu (2003) modified Abel (1990) by measuring the utility of the “keeping up with
the Joneses” effect from the marginal consumption level. Their finding is critical and is utilized to constructing the
model of this study after its development. Liu and Turnovsky (2005) considered both macroeconomic dynamics
with consumption and production externalities as the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect in consumption and
production functions and capital stock externalities in production. In this study, the production function that deter-
mines wages is considered a human capital externality. This externality, described as the average education level of
an economy, is designed to increase personal income. Mino (2008) developed an overlapping generations (OLG)
model with a consumption externality and demonstrated that the consumption externality fundamentally affects
both the equilibrium and the steady state characterization. Because children’s education is primarily affected by
parents, the OLG economy is better for considering education. However, because the OLG economy might be too
complicated, this study does not consider generations. These prior articles delicately developed consumption exter-
nalities, however only considered consumption externalities and not education externalities. In addition, regarding
education as consumption is incorrect because education directly and indirectly affects the entire economy.
In this study, a simple model of the education externality is developed and analyzed. The result of the anal-
ysis show that two equilibria exist that react differently to the level of productivity if an education externality is
considered. Moreover, the net marginal benefit is found to determine social preferences for education.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section is devoted to describing the model,
including an education externality. The third section provides an analysis of equilibria. The fourth section develops
a social planner’s solution and discusses on policy implications. The final section concludes this paper.
2 Model
We develop a model of education externality. The economy comprises representative household and competitive
firms.
2.1 Household
We assume that the representative household obtains utility from consumption and education. The representative
household’s utility function is as follows:
u(c; e) = c+ v
h e
E

  e
i
; (1)
where c represents consumption, v is a constant that represents the importance of education in utility, e denotes
the education level of the household, and E indicates the reference level of education that can be interpreted as the
average level of education in the society. We also assume the parameter  > 1 to account for the “keeping up with
the Joneses” effect. This effect indicates that a household increase its own education level if the education level of
other households, or the reference level, is high.
The (e=E) term can be interpreted as the utility from the relative education level, which reflects strictly
increasing returns to scale. The  e term indicates the disutility from education as the effort cost. This model
assumes that the peer group unilaterally affects the household and considers exogenous and full correlated effects
from the classification by Manski (1993). Manski (1993) divided the social effects in a group into three types:
endogenous, exogenous, and correlated effects.
Two points regarding the specification of the utility function are in order. The first is that the utility function
has a quasi-linear form, for which several reasons exist. The first reason is that the function represents education
externality. A non-homothetic characteristic is required for this type of externality; moreover, Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2008) developed the restricted homothetic (RH) property and showed that the indeterminacy case does not
hold the RH property. Second, we employ this specification to facilitate an evaluation of the education externality.
Dupor and Liu (2003) suggested that the externality must be measured from the marginal utility of consumption.
Therefore I added the utility function as (1) for the simple expression of the two reasons. In addition, Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000) uses this type quasi-linear utility function in terms of consumption externality and labor disutility.
The second point is the existence of an education externality that is determined as  > 1. No empirical study
estimates the level of education externality. However, several empirical studies conjectured the presence of the
externality as we noted in the introduction section.
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The household earns wages from a firm by supplying one unit of labor. The household faces the following
budget constraint:
c+ pe = w(e) + w; (2)
where p represents the price of one unit of education, w(e) represents the wage that the household earns from a
firm related to one’s education level, and w represents the wage that the household earns from a firm regardless of
education level. Therefore, the household maximizes its utility according to the budget constraint (2).
2.2 Firm
Perfectly competitive firms pay wages to workers according to their productivity. The productivity of workers is
represented in the following equation:
AeE1  + w = w(e) + w; (3)
whereA is total factor productivity, and  is a coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production function that takes value
in the interval between 0 and 1.
The final goods produced by firms are used in consumption or in the education system. This production function
indicates that if the average level of education is low, the effect of investment in private education is weak, and vice
versa. Moreover, this specification indicates that personal investment in education increases social productivity.
This relationship corresponds to secondary education rather than higher education, such as lectures at a university.
The reason for this result is that, on the one hand, education from a university can be interpreted as a signal
and may not necessarily improve a person’s ability. On the other hand, secondary education is mainly primarily
comprises learning basic skills for work, i.e., reading, writing, and calculating. Therefore, this specification is
primarily considered in the relationship between secondary education and wage and is compatible with the results
of the empirical studies by Trostel (2004) and Moretti (2004).
2.3 Optimization problem
The representative household maximizes its own utility when accounting for the firm’s paying action. Then, by
combining equations (1), (2), and (3) and imposing non-negative conditions on e and c, the maximization problem
is as follows:
max
c;e
u(c; e) = c+ v
h e
E

  e
i
s:t: c+ pe = AeE1  + w; c  0; e  0: (4)
The first-order condition of the problem is
5
ve 1E    vE 1 = p Ae 1E1 :
Rearranging the condition, we obtain
ve 1E  +Ae 1E1  = p+ v: (5)
The non-negative condition is
w  pe AeE1 ; and e  0:
Hereafter, we assume that w is large enough to have interior solutions and we concentrate on the interior solutions
for simplicity. The left-hand side of equation (5) is the individual’s marginal benefits of education and the right-
hand side indicates the individual’s marginal costs of education. However, this equation cannot be solved because
of its non-linearity, and is analyzed in the next section.
3 Analysis of equilibria
We analyze the model by dividing it into two parts. The first part is no education externality case and the second
part is the education externality case. The second part is devoted toward determining how the education externality
affects the economy. Hereafter, we concentrate on variable e because it is the determinant variable of this model.
3.1 Benchmark
First, we assume that no education externality exists, v = 0, as the benchmark of the model. We derive the
equilibrium of the model. From equation (5), we obtain:
Ae 1E1  = p:
Solving the equation by e, we obtain the equilibrium:
e =
0B@A
p
1CA
1
1 
E  e^; c = (1  )A 11 
0B@
p
1CA

1 
E + w: (6)
We compare this result with the education externality case discussed in the next subsection.
3.2 Education externality
Second, we assume that a positive education externality exists, v > 0. We derive the optimal solution but cannot
solve equation (5) in its explicit form because of its non-linearity. Therefore, we conduct a comparative statistical
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Figure 3: The existence of equilibria: case A = 2;  = 0:6; E = 1:5; v = 1;  = 2; p = 1:5.
analysis on equilibria. First, we derive the condition for the two existing equilibria. If the next condition is satisfied,
we have two equilibria.
p 

v
(1  )E
 1 
 

A
   1
  1
 
(   ) < p+ v: (7)
See the Appendix for a derivation of the condition. Figure 3 assists in understanding the existence of equilibria.
Condition (7) implies that some e exists that shows that the marginal benefits of education exceed the marginal
costs of education. If condition (7) is not satisfied, the marginal benefits of education are always greater than
the marginal costs of education. Then, the optimal solution for the household is yielded as (c; e) = (+1;+1).
Therefore, the equilibrium does not exist.
We then assume that inequality (7) is satisfied and we define the two equilibria, eL and eH (eL < eH), for
convenience. Hereafter, we analyze the nature of these equilibria. First, we check the stability of the equilibria.
The equilibrium eL is stable because the first-order derivative around eL of the left-hand side of equation (5) is
negative. However, the equilibrium eH is unstable because the first-order derivative around eH of the left-hand side
of equation (5) is positive. If the equilibrium eH suddenly increases, the marginal benefits overwhelm the marginal
costs. Therefore, the level of education increases to the c = 0 point. If the equilibrium eH suddenly decreases,
the level of education declines until it gets to eL. In a real economy, as Figure 1 shows the Japanese high school
enrollment rate, which has increased rapidly, is approximately 100%. Therefore, because Japan seems to be in
eH equilibrium and to have deviated to increase, we should examine the eH equilibrium and discuss whether the
unstable equilibrium is common in economic literature, particularly applied economics. For example, although
the saddle path in the growth theory of macroeconomics is unstable, it is frequently investigated for its economic
importance. In addition, this model does not consider time. When the parameters change, we solve other problems
and obtain other equilibria. For these reasons, the equilibria are worth investigating. We need to present the next
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lemma to clarify the range of the two equilibria.
Lemma 1. The two equilibria eL and eH exist in the range 0 < eL < e < eH , where e is the minimizing value of
the left-hand side of the first order condition.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We obtain the following proposition by comparing the benchmark case and the education externality case.
Proposition 1. When the condition, (A=p)
 1
1  < E, holds, eL < e^ < eH is satisfied.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that the condition that is primarily affected by the parameters E and  is satisfied, and no
externality equilibrium e^ exists between externality equilibria eL and eH . When the condition is satisfied and the
equilibria eL and eH are statistically counted in the same country, the data may indicate that no externality exists
in the country even though it exists. If the condition is satisfied, the equilibrium eL represents an underinvestment
in education and the equilibrium eH represents an overinvestment in education from the no externality perspective.
If the condition is not satisfied, then the case (A=p)
 1
1   E holds, and the relationship among eL, eH , and e^ is
either eL < eH  e^ or e^  eL < eH . The former case implies that the education externality always decreases the
investment in education, and the latter case implies that the education externality always increases the investment
in education. However, we cannot distinguish among the two cases. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For each equilibrium, the following properties hold;
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
dwH
dA
< 0 and
deH
dA
< 0;
dwL
dA
> 0 and
deL
dA
> 0 if p < p+ v < ~p
dwH
dA
= 0 and
deH
dA
< 0;
dwL
dA
> 0 and
deL
dA
> 0 if ~p = p+ v
dwH
dA
> 0 and
deH
dA
< 0;
dwL
dA
> 0 and
deL
dA
> 0 if ~p < p+ v;
where ~p is defined as follows:
~p 
 v
E
 1 
 

A
   1
  1
 
1+
1 
  : (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that, on the one hand, if productivity A increases, the wage and the level of education in
equilibrium eL also increase. On the other hand, when p is large enough, ifA increases, the wage increases and the
education level eH decreases. When p is not large, but is in the range of p < p < ~p, if A increases, the wage and
the level of education decrease. These suspicious movements in the education level and wages are caused by the
first-order condition (5). First, we consider the eH case. When A increases, the first term on the left-hand side of
8
(5) decreases to sustain the first-order-condition, that is, decreases e. The wage is determined by wH(eH) through
a comparison of the increase in wages by A and the decrease in wages by eH . Therefore, if the former is larger
than the latter, the wage increases. If the latter is larger than the former, the wage decreases. Second, we consider
the eL case. When A increases, at eL, the household increases the education level to adjust the marginal wage
equally considering the effect of utility from relative education. Therefore, at eL, an increasing A always increases
education level e. Therefore, the wage wL(eL) always increase because an increasing A itself adds to the wages
and an increasing A indirectly affects wages through the positive relationship with e.
The economic theory predicts that the wage difference increases the high school graduation rate, as discussed
in the introduction. And the data show the predicted movement in the United States. However, the data show the
opposite movement and are not compatible with the theory in Japan. Proposition 2 theoretically explains these
movements of Japan and the United States in the same model that the theory cannot explain. In Japan, productivity
A declines as times passes.2 If we ignore the education externality term, which means that v = 0 holds, education
level e and wage level w also decrease. However, the data show the opposite movement. If we focus on the
equilibrium eH with the p < p + v < ~p condition, declining A induces an increasing education level eH and
wage w(eH). We interpret w(e) as the wage of high school graduates and w as the wage of only having graduated
from compulsory education. Therefore, the equilibrium with this condition is compatible with these movements in
Japan.
In contrast, in the United States, the productivity A increases as times passes,3 and the high school graduate ?
s wage and graduation rate both increase. These movements are compatible with the v = 0 case and the eL
equilibrium case. Therefore we impose the equilibrium eH to represent Japan and the equilibrium eLto represent
the United States. When the condition for Proposition 1, (A=p)
 1
1  < E, is satisfied, if we do not consider
the education externality, the United States, eL, is overeducated and Japan, eH , is undereducated, based on the
education externality case. In the next section, we examine the preferred equilibrium from the perspective of the
social planner.
4 Social planner’s solution and policy implications
In this section, we consider the problem from the social planner’s perspective to examine how education affects the
social welfare of the economy. In this section, we regard the reference level of education E as the personal level
of education level e .
2This condition occurs because the growth rate of the multifactor productivity decreases from 1985 to 2011 according to the OECD statistics
database.
3This occurrence is from the slight increase in the growth rate of multifactor productivity from 1985 to 2011 according to the OECD
statistics database.
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4.1 Social planner’s solution
To examine how education affects the social welfare of the economy, we solve another problem regarding the
reference level of education as the personal education decision. From the classification of social effects in a group
by Manski (1993), this analysis is classified as complete correlated effects, which considers the case that the
members of a group behave perfectly in the same manner. We maximize social welfare as follows:
max
c;e
u(c; e) = c+ v
264
0B@e
e
1CA

  e
375 = c+ v(1  e) (9)
s:t: c+ pe = AeE1  + w = Ae+ w:
Solving problem (9), we obtain the next result, for which a is an arbitrary value:
(c; e) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(w; 0) (A < p+ v)
(w; a) (A = p+ v)
(+1;+1) (A > p+ v):
The interpretation of this solution is that when A < p + v holds, the social planner does not want to invest in
education; when A = p + v holds, the planner has no intention to pursue education; and when A > p + v holds,
the planner wants to invest as much as possible in education. Therefore, we have two propositions.
Proposition 3. When A < p + v holds, the education level determined by households is always higher than that
determined by the social planner.
Proof. The proof is obvious from a comparison of the social planner’s and the household’s solution.
Proposition 4. The social preferences on equilibria eH and eL are as follows.
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
eH  eL A > p+ v
eH  eL A = p+ v
eH  eL A < p+ v
where  represents “strictly preferred to,”  represents “indifferent to,” and  represents “ strictly worse than.”
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 means that when A < p+ v holds, that is, the financial and effort costs of education are greater
than the unit gain from education, the social planner believes that households should not invest in education.
However, households’ investment in education is greater than zero because the marginal gains from wage and
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education externalities pay for the marginal cost of education. Therefore, the planner always suffers from an
overinvestment in education.
Proposition 4 states that social preferences are determined through a comparison of productivity A and the
monetary and psychological costs of education p + v. When A > p + v holds, a higher level of education is
better for the social planner. When A = p + v holds, the social planner does not consider the level of education.
When A < p + v holds, the social planner dislikes investments in education and, therefore, prefers a lower level
of education. Normally, in a developed country, A > p+ v tends to hold because productivity A is relatively high
and the cost is relatively low. Therefore, the social planner prefers Japan equilibrium eH over the United States
equilibrium eL. Surely, the parameters between Japan and the United States are different. Therefore, comparing
the Japan’s equilibrium with the United States equilibrium using real data is useless. Proposition 4 insists that the
United States can increase social welfare from the planner’s perspective by moving into eH equilibrium. However,
this move may evoke reductions in large amounts of consumption, which may then reduce households’ welfare
because people in the United States might put significant weight on consumption. Therefore we must consider this
point when considering policy implications in the next subsection.
4.2 Policy implications
Normally, in a developing country, the condition A < p + v tends to hold because productivity A is relatively
low compared with the costs p and v. In a developing country, the planner—the government—initially dislikes
investments in education. However, although the government does not want to facilitate education, households
invest in education. Finally, increasing productivity A which is caused by some exogenous factors, reverses the
planner’s preferences for education and the government facilitates investments in education. This chain of events
represents a country’s development process. Frequently, we cannot examine this theory because of a lack of
accurate developing country data on education, consumption, productivity, and so on. Therefore, further research
is required on this subject.
Moreover, we measure this economy using consumption level. The main motivation for individuals to pursue
an education is to consume more goods by earning higher wages. By rearranging the budget constraint (2), we
obtain
c  w = e  Ae 1E1    p : (10)
Solving equation (10) to equal the zero condition gives:
e =
0B@A
p
1CA
1
1 
E: (11)
If the equilibrium holds, ei > e(i = H;L), then at equilibrium we consume goods less than that of the zero
education choice. Therefore, the following proposition is presented.
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Proposition 5. If the following condition (12) is satisfied, then we have eL < e < eH :
v
2664 E
0B@A
p
1CA
 1
1 
  1
3775 < (1  )p: (12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 states that, at the equilibrium eH , if condition (12) holds, then the consumption level of the
equilibrium is less than that of zero education w. In this case, the level of education is relatively high and earns
higher wages than the equilibrium eL. However, the highest earned wage that is increased by education is primarily
used to obtain a higher education, and the consumption level is lowered by a higher education. This result can be
interpreted as education for education’s sake. When A > p + v holds, the planner prefers equilibrium eH and
encourages households to be more educated. Therefore, the primary motivation is not achieved. To discourage
education for education’s sake, increasing productivity A seems to be a good policy. Using the results of Proposi-
tion 2, increasing A induces households to decrease the equilibrium value eH and to increase the threshold value
e. Therefore, the condition (12) is less likely to be satisfied.
These findings show that increasing productivity A is a good policy regarding both the developing economy
problem and the education for education’s sake problem. To plan and execute policies that increase productivityA,
a budget is required. Considering the government’s budget constraints, a lump-sum tax on income and a propor-
tional tax on consumption seem to be optimal uses of financial resources for the policy to increase productivity A.
Because a proportional tax on education induces individuals to reduce education at eL equilibrium and to increase
education at eH equilibrium by increasing relative price of education p, such a tax on education e is harmful for
eH equilibrium. Therefore, we must consider the equilibrium that we are in when we tax and subsidize economic
activity.
5 Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of education externality on the economy. The two education equilibria in this
model conversely react to increasing productivity. This characteristic of the model enables us to explain the puz-
zling movements in Japanese education, wage, and productivity. We then determined that the parameter relation-
ship between the productivity of firms and the price of education determines the social preferences for education
from the social planner’s perspective.
I now look toward the prospects of extending this model. The first possibility is to treat the reference level of
education E as an endogenous variable. In this study, the endogenous effects of the Manski (1993) classification
are ignored. The exogenous and the correlated effects are investigated in section three and four, respectively.
However, in the real world, these ideal cases are rare. Moreover, determining the reference level of education has
not been well theorized. Therefore, consideringE as the endogenous variable may change the results of this model.
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Such future research may assist us in completely understanding education externality. The second possibility is to
consider dynamics. The time series graphs are shown in the introduction; however, the model does not consider
the dynamics of the economic variables. Therefore, introducing dynamics into this model may change the results.
The third, estimating the parameters, particularly v and , is necessary. If v is not significant, the theory collapses
and we must search for a new model to explain the suspicious movements of the variables for Japan. If  satisfies
the condition 0 <   1, the model does not have two equilibria. Even though equilibrium exists, which may
increase the equilibrium level compared with the no externality case, productivity A affects e given that it has the
same sign as the no education externality case. We may have many other extensions for this model, and research
on these extensions can be fruitful.
Appendix
Existence of equilibria
First, we define the left-hand side of (5) as f(e). Second, we take the first-order derivative of f(e) by e and set
f 0(e) = 0 to obtain:
f 0(e) = v(   1)e 2E  +A(   1)e 2E1  = 0:
Solving the equation for e gives us the solution, and we define the solution e as follows:
e =

A(1  )E1 +
v(   1)
 1
 
:
Third, we prove that e takes the minimal value of f(e). Taking the second-order derivative of f(e), we obtain:
f 00(e) = v(   1)e 3E  +A(   1)(   2)e 3E1  > 0;
for all e > 0: The equation indicates that e takes the minimal value of f(e). For the existence of equilibria, we
must hold that the minimal value of the left-hand side of (5), f(e), is smaller than the right-hand side of (5). The
condition is:
f(e) =
0B@ v
(1  )E
1CA
1 
  0B@ A
   1
1CA
 1
 
(   ) < p+ v:
Therefore, the condition is obtained.
Proof of lemma 1
From the previous discussion, e takes the minimal value of f(e): From the intermediate value theorem and the
limits of the first-order condition:
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lim
e!+0
ve 1E  +Ae 1E1  = +1
and
lim
e!1 ve
 1E  +Ae 1E1  = +1;
there exist equilibria in the open interval (0; e) and (e;+1), respectively. Because f(e) is monotonically decreas-
ing in interval (0; e) and its lower bound is f(e) in interval (e;+1), f(e) is monotonically increasing and its lower
bound is f(e). Therefore, 0 < eL < e < eH holds.
Proof of proposition 1
Use (5) and (6). Arranging (5), we obtain:
Ae 1E1  + ve 1E    p  v = 0: (13)
To evaluate the left-hand side of (13), substitute e^ into the left-hand side of (13), then to obtain the value at e^:
v
2664 E
0B@ p
A
1CA
 1
 1
  1
3775: (14)
If (14) is negative, then eL < e^ < eH , which is obvious from the form of f(e) previously shown.
Proof of proposition 2
First, from the proof of proposition 1, use (13) as follows:
Ae 1E1  + ve 1E    p  v = 0:
To determine the relationship between e and A, differentiate the left-hand side of (13) by e and A to obtain:
de
dA
=  
e 1E1 
A(   1)e 2E1  + v(   1)e 2E  : (15)
The numerator always takes a positive value; therefore, the sign of de=dA depends on the denominator. We know
that the denominator is equivalent to f 0(e). Therefore, at the equilibrium eL, the denominator has a negative value
and de=dA > 0 holds. At eH , the denominator has a positive value and de=dA < 0 holds.
Second, because the wage is determined by w = AeE1  + w, we differentiate between A and e, to obtain:
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dw
dA
= eE1  +Ae 1E1 
de
dA
:
Then, we substitute (15) into this equation to obtain:
dw
dA
=
e 1E1 

v(   1)e 1E   Ae 1E1 
A(   1)e 2E1  + v(   1)e 2E  :
The sign of the denominator as a function of e is known because it is the same as f 0(e). If an equilibrium exists
between 0 and e, f 0(e) is negative at the equilibrium. If an equilibrium is greater than e, f 0(e) is positive at
the equilibrium. Therefore, the sign of the numerator reveals the sign of dw=dA. The threshold value ~e of the
numerator is determined by the following equation:
v(   1)e 1E   Ae 1E1  = 0;
for e 1E1  is positive. We solve the equation by e to obtain:
~e =
264AE1 +
v(   1)
375
1
 
:
We easily check that ~e > e using (1  ) 1  < 1. If an equilibrium is between 0 and ~e, the numerator is negative
at the equilibrium. If an equilibrium is greater than ~e, the numerator is positive at the equilibrium. Then, to obtain
the parametrized condition on ~e, substitute ~e into (5) to obtain the threshold parameter as follows:
~p 
0B@ A
   1
1CA
 1
  0B@E
v
1CA
 1
 
1+
1 
  = p+ v:
From the above, we summarize the result for dw=dA as follows. At eL, the denominator and numerator are both
negative because eL < e < ~e. Then, we obtain dw=dA > 0. At eH < ~e, the denominator is positive and the
numerator is negative because e < eH < ~e. Further, we obtain dw=dA < 0. At eH = ~e, the denominator is 0 and
we obtain dw=dA = 0. At eH > ~e, both the denominator and the numerator are positive because e < ~e < eH and
we obtain dw=dA > 0. Therefore, the proposition is proved.
Proof of proposition 4
From budget constraint (2), we obtain:
c = (A  p)e+ w:
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By substituting the equation into the utility function of the social planner, the utility level is measured by (A  p 
v)e + v + w. From the proof of lemma 1, eL < eH is satisfied. Therefore, when A > p + v, the social planner
prefers eH to eL. When A < p + v, the planner prefers eL to eH , and when A = p + v; education choice eH is
indifferent to eL from the social planner’s perspective.
Proof of proposition 5
Write the left-hand side of (13) as follows:
Ae 1E1  + ve 1E    p  v:
Substitute (11) into the equation to obtain:
v
2664 E
0B@A
p
1CA
 1
1 
  1
3775  (1  )p:
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